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 Abstract: This paper focuses on the endogenous determination of effort as a source 
of productivity growth. The economy is populated by infinitely lived households. Every 
period, members of each household may choose whether to be self-employed or 
become employees in a “corporate sector”. Labor relations in the corporate sector 
are characterized by a double-moral hazard problem. To induce effort, the optimal 
labor contract stipulates for a bonus. Nevertheless, due to double moral hazard, 
employees extract some rents. As the economy grows, employees’ rents increase, 
thereby raising the marginal benefit of monitoring. The ensuing changes in the 
optimal labor contract induce higher effort along the growth path. The model creates 
an endogenous association between growth and total factor productivity, and 
demonstrates that substantial cross-country productivity differences may be ascribed 
to differences in incentive structures. 
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JEL Classification: D82, O40 1. Introduction
Understanding the large diﬀerences in total factor productivity (hereafter TFP)
among countries is a challenge of great importance to the economics profession.
The striking fact is that at the aggregate level, TFP is closely correlated with
income (see, for example, Jones [1998]). As a matter of fact, the observation
that TFP diﬀerences are “responsible” for almost the entire diﬀerences in income,
has motivated Prescott to impress upon the economics profession the “need” for
“a theory of total factor productivity” (Prescott [19 9 8 ] ) . H e r ew es h o wt h a t
substantial productivity diﬀerences may be ascribed to endogenous diﬀerences in
the power of incentives embodies in labor contracts.
The diﬀerences in TFP have been previously associated by some economists
with diﬀerences in the access to technology (Romer, [1993]). Others have pointed
to diﬀerences in factor endowments (in particular of skilled workers) as a source
of diﬀerences in TFP (Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992]). Acemoglu and Zilibotti
[2001] take the impact of the factor endowment a step further. According to
their view, economies which are well endowed with skilled workers are also those
that develop new technologies. However, these technologies are suited to skilled
workers and not to the less-skilled workers found in LDCs, and therefore the free
ﬂo wo fi d e a si si n s u ﬃcient to close the TFP gap.
Prescott [1998] argues that TFP diﬀerences are not necessarily due to diﬀer-
ences in the stock of knowledge. He cites several studies that demonstrate that
TFP diﬀerences are associated with diﬀerences in work practices and organiza-
tion. Hall and Jones [1999] argue that social obstacles hinder some economies
from adopting high-productivity production technologies. They concentrate on
1“social infrastructure” as an explanatory variable. According to this explanation,
countries whose policies are “favorable to productive activities - rather than di-
version - produce much more output per worker”. Parente and Prescott [1999]
argue that poor economies remain poor because monopolists that control factor
supply prevent the adoption of superior technologies. Kocherlakota [2001]c o n -
centrates on the technology adoption issue formally. In his paper, it is the ability
to enforce a social contract that makes the diﬀerence. Economies, in which such
an enforcement is not possible, do not adopt a superior production technology
(which is available at some cost), while economies in which the social contract is
enforceable, do.
We too emphasize the role of institutional arrangements in aﬀecting productiv-
ity. In our framework, total factor productivity reﬂects neither the knowledge of
how to produce, nor the factor endowment or the composition of the labor force,
but solely workers’ eﬀort.1 Due to information constraints, eﬀort has to be in-
duced by appropriate incentives that are incorporated in the labor contracts. The
power of such incentives to induce eﬀort depends crucially on the speciﬁcn a t u r e
of the information constraints. Nevertheless, as an economy grows, the incentive
structure of the labor contracts changes endogenously, and induces higher eﬀort
and productivity.
We develop an example of these processes in a framework that combines a
standard growth environment with a principal-agent model characterized by dou-
1Schmitz’s [2001] very detailed study of labor productivity of the U.S. and Canadian iron-ore
industries shows that great productivity gains can be attributed to changes in eﬀort per hour
worked and in work rules. Schmitz argues that his case study demonstrates that “productivity
diﬀerences across other industries may be also due in some substantial part to factors other than
production technology, physical capital and human capital.”
2ble moral hazard.2 Speciﬁcally, we consider an economy in which two technologies
m a yb eu s e dt op r o d u c et h es a m eg o o d .T h eﬁrst technology uses only labor as
input and workers are “self employed”. However, not all workers are identical in
their productivity if they choose to be self employed. The second technology uses
capital and labor and is operated by “ﬁrms”. In this technology all workers are
ex-ante identical, and their productivity depends on the amount of eﬀort they
exert. Workers dislike to expend eﬀort, and their eﬀort level is not veriﬁable.
This creates a standard moral hazard problem. To provide incentives, ﬁrms are
engaged in monitoring. Monitoring precision is costly and non veriﬁable, a fact
that creates another moral hazard problem between workers and employers.3 The
ensuing Nash game between workers and employers, where the former choose ef-
fort and the latter monitoring intensity, results in a bonus scheme. The scheme
optimally trades oﬀ the workers’ rent against eﬃciency.
The analysis is framed in a dynamic setting. The economy is populated by
inﬁnitely lived risk neutral households that maximize their discounted expected
utility. Each household chooses every period whether its members will be self-
employed or employees. In the latter case, the household faces the bonus scheme
and selects its members’ eﬀort level. Households allocate income between con-
sumption and saving in the standard way.
Firms hire capital and decide on the monitoring intensity every period so as to
maximize proﬁts. The optimal structure of the bonus contract that emerges turns
2Other models with informational rents could probably be used to generate similar results.
See the conclusion for a brief discussion.
3The resulting double moral hazard problem is diﬀerent from the one usually analyzed in
the labor economics literature. In particular using a tournament would not resolve the issue
addressed here.
3o u tt od e p e n do nt h ea m o u n to fc a p i t a lh i r e db yt h eﬁrms. This implies that the
equilibrium eﬀort level and the number of employees also depend on that amount
of capital.
The growth process out of steady state is characterized by increases in capital
and in labor productivity. Speciﬁcally, higher amounts of capital increase the
demand for labor. Since the additional labor needs to be enticed away from
self-employment, labor contracts have to become more attractive, reﬂecting the
higher productivity of workers in their alternative occupation. The “better” labor
contracts entail higher bonuses and more monitoring, and thereby induce higher
eﬀort. Consequently, as the economy grows, more workers become employees, and
productivity increases without any technical progress or change in human capital.4
In order to assess the potential quantitative magnitudes of these eﬀects, we
solve the model numerically using plausible parameter values. We show that our
numerical model can mimic quite well productivity growth, increases in monitoring
costs, and the relationship between productivity and the corporate employee share
that have been documented in the literature.
The paper starts with a short presentation of some stylized facts. Next, present
the model. We discuss the static problem of the workers and of the ﬁrms and derive
the optimal bonus contract. We also show that the contract is consistent with the
dynamic optimization problem of the households. We then parameterize some key
functions in our economy, and derive the equilibrium conditions for that speciﬁc
case. We conduct some comparative static experiments on the steady-state of the
4Once the economy reaches a steady state this process stops. We choose to abstract from
sustained growth in order to highlight the interrelationship between the changes in capital and
the incentive contracts.
4economy and asses the impact of particular parameters governing the monitoring
technology on eﬀort and productivity. Finally, we numerically evaluate a dynamic
equilibrium path and discuss its properties. The last section of the paper brieﬂy
discusses the scope of our results.
2. Some Stylized Facts
There is by now a large body of knowledge, both empirical and theoretical, that
focuses on the large cross-county diﬀerences in per-capita output and productivity.
This is the key observation that drives our model. However, our model generates
in addition time-paths and cross-economy relationships of some variables that,
while documented for various purposes, have not necessarily been at the focus of
the growth literature. This short section aims at providing a summary of these
observations.
Hall and Jones (1999) compute productivity indices (relative to the US) and
per-capita output of 127 countries. They (and many others) ﬁnd large diﬀerences
among countries, and a very clear (possibly non-linear) relationship between out-
put per-worker and productivity, as depicted in Figure 1(see also Hall and Jones,
Figure 1):5
5The simple correlation between productivity and output in this data set is 0.85. The data


























We have augmented the Hall and Jones data with two features related to
the labor market in various economies, as reported in Bernanke and Gürkaynak
(2001). Speciﬁcally, Table X of that paper reports the corporate employee share
in the labor force for many countries, and several (highly correlated) measures of
the labor share in income that correct for possible under-reporting of income of
workers who are outside the corporate sector (self-employed and others).6 Figure
2 shows the relationship between the Hall and Jones productivity measure and
the corporate employee share. As can be seen, these two variables are quite highly
correlated (a simple correlation of 0.68).
6Bernanke and Gürkaynak report only their calculations for countries whose corporate labor
force share exceeds 50%. For countries with low fraction of corporate employees they got very
high labor shares in income, which they think are unreasonable. Our model predicts that under
certain circumstances, there may indeed exist a very high correlation between the fraction of




























In contrast, there is basically no relationship between the labor share in income
and the Hall and Jones productivity measure (simple correlation of 0.08), as Figure



























7Finally, there is some evidence on the role of management in a growing econ-
omy. Radner (1992) presents evidence concerning the increased share of resources
used for the purpose of ”managing in the economy”.7 Figure 4 replicates Radner’s
Table 6, that reports the fraction of managers in the (experienced) US labor force
between 1900 and 1980.
Figure 4:






















We consider a single good, discrete time economy with a constant population of
inﬁnitely lived households indexed on the unit interval by h. We describe the
7Radner’s partial list of ”what managers do” includes, of course, ”monitor the actions of
other ﬁrm members” (p. 1388).
8households in some detail, before we specify the two technologies with which the
good can be produced
3.1. Households
Each household h consists of a continuum of identical members indexed over the
unit interval. The household owns kt(h) units of capital at the beginning of
period t that are inelastically supplied to the capital market at the rental rate rt.
In addition, each member of the household is endowed with 1 unit of labor per
period that is inelastically supplied. Every member i of the household may exert
eﬀort  i
t(h). Eﬀort may potentially aﬀect that member’s labor productivity in a
way to be speciﬁed below. However, household members are not decision-making
units. They are agents of the household and carry out its decisions, in particular
those concerning eﬀort.8
All households in the economy have identical preferences. At every period,
they are assumed to care (positively) about their aggregate consumption, xt,a n d
(negatively) about the amount of eﬀort exerted by each of their members,  t. 9
Households are assumed to be maximizing the discounted stream of momentary
8The goal of this structure is to remove any idiosyncratic uncertainty at the household level
(see Shi [1998] for a similarly motivated speciﬁcation). Speciﬁcally, one may think of the house-
hold members as ”machines” that are ”programmed” by the household and have no will of their
own. Alternatively, one may think of the household as an institution that can fully and costlessly
monitor its members.
9Clearly, one may also think of the household preferences as the aggregate over individual





However (3.1) follows since xi
t = xt and  i





tu(xt,  t) (3.1)
where η denotes the discount factor. For the momentary utility, we specify
u(xt,  t)=xt − c( t) (3.2)
where the function c( ) measures the disutility of eﬀort. The function c(·) is
assumed to be increasing and convex with c(0) = 0. In addition, we impose a
minimum subsistence level per member, denoted by x.10
Labor can be used in either one of two technologies. In one of them, the workers
will be referred to as being “self-employed” and in the other as “employees”. If
self-employed, a member of household h produces output y(h) at no eﬀort cost.11
Without loss of generality, households are ordered in such a way that y0(·) > 0.
Alternatively, a household may decide to send its members to the labor mar-
ket as employees. Once employed, each member exerts the household determined
eﬀort level  , and obtains a corresponding compensation in terms of output. De-
spite the fact that members of distinct households have diﬀerent productivity if
self-employed, they are assumed to be equally productive as employees.12
The budget constraint of the household depends on the employment status of
10The linear speciﬁcation of the utility function is used for parsimony to keep the subsequent
employment contract simple. The subsistence level is introduced to generate more realistic
dynamics in the face of that linearity.
11Obviously, including eﬀort costs would not change anything as y(h) could be interpreted
as production net of these costs. Furthermore, the assumption that the self-employed technol-
ogy does not require any other input is made purely for convenience and does not aﬀect the
conclusions.
12Relaxing this assumption would considerably complicate contracts as they would have to be
type-dependent. However, this would not substantially alter the model’s implications.
10its members. We discuss the speciﬁcs after the introduction of the optimal bonus
scheme.
3.2. Firms
Firms are employing capital and labor. The eﬀectiveness of labor provided by an
employee depends on the eﬀort   exerted by that employee. Anticipating that it
will be to the ﬁrms’ advantage to provide equal eﬀort incentives across workers,
we write the production function of ﬁrms as F(K, L), where K and L denote the
per-ﬁrm capital and labor employment.13 We make standard assumptions on the
production function. In particular, it is assumed that the production function is
homogeneous of degree 1 in both arguments.
3.3. The double moral hazard problem
In this subsection, we solely focus on the contractual game between a represen-
tative household and a ﬁrm. We assume that the game has to be played every
period independently of the past. In doing so, we rule out long term contracts
and any reputation eﬀect either on the part of ﬁrms or households.14
Our key assumption is that workers’ eﬀort is not directly contractible. As a
result, households’ behavior is aﬀected by problems of moral hazard. On the other
hand, it is assumed that ﬁrms can generate contractible information on eﬀort. This
introduces the ability to mitigate the moral hazard problem through the use of
13Assuming eﬀective labor is additive across workers, production can be written as
F(K,
R
L  (h)dh) where L is the set of employees of the ﬁrm.
14Obviously, this restriction is a very simple way to generate rents. In general, any modelling
device that sustains the existence of rents (or risk premia) will lead to organizational transaction
costs that underly our analysis.
11proper incentives. More concretely, we assume that every worker is emitting noisy
signals related to the eﬀort level. At some costs, these signals can be measured
and made veriﬁable. Accordingly, these signals become contractible. However, the
fact that signal measurements are costly to the ﬁrm introduces a further moral
hazard problem, this time on the part of employers. Our assumption here is that
though information is veriﬁable, the precision of that information is not.15 This
double moral-hazard problem is resolved through a game which determines the
precision at which the signals will be measured and the extent to which they will
be used in the labor contract.
In order to derive the optimal decision of the ﬁrm in the appropriate game,
we assume here that in each period households maximize their income net of
eﬀort costs. In the next subsection, we show that under the derived contract, this
presumed behavior is consistent with the preference speciﬁcation as given in (3.1)
and (3.2). Because the same game is repeated every period, we omit the time
index whenever no confusion may result.
The ﬁrm faces the problem of how much eﬀort to induce. This decision entails
a choice of an employment contract and of the amount of resources it allocates to
the process of measuring the emitted signals. The latter determines the precision
at which these signals are measured, which is parameterized by θ.
At this point, we can draw from existing results in the literature. In particular,
it is known that in the current setting — due to the risk-neutrality of both parties —
15To give a concrete example, suppose that a university contract promises a positive tenure
decision whenever a tenure commission presents two ‘good’ reports from external qualiﬁed aca-
demics. The precision of such a scheme is obviously manipulable, since a tenure commission
could always ask for more than two reports and only present those reports that are found
advantageous.
12optimal incentive contracts are of the bonus type, where a worker receives a ﬁxed
payment A, and depending on the realization of the measured signal, a bonus
B.16 These results depend on the aforementioned assumption, that relates the
distribution of the signals to the worker’s eﬀort. Moreover, consistent with the
moral hazard problem of the ﬁrm, it is assumed that this distribution also depends
on the precision of measurement.
Since the optimal contract is of the bonus type, the measured signals can be
aggregated to a binary random variable, χ ∈ {0,1},w h e r et h ew o r k e rr e c e i v e st h e
bonus if χ =0 .W ed e n o t e
p( ,θ)=P r[ χ =0|  ,θ] . (3.3)
We assume that p  > 0 and p   < 0. Heuristically the ﬁrst requirement means
that χ =0constitutes a ‘favorable’ information with respect to the agent’s action
in the sense of Milgrom (1981). The concavity requirement guarantees that the
agent’s problem is well behaved. The conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for
any action to be implementable with the binary signal χ. 17
Finally, we let φ(θ) denote the resource cost of precision per worker. Regarding
precision, we assume pθ < 0,p θθ > 0 and φθ > 0,φ θθ > 0. The conditions on
the ﬁrst derivative are not real restrictions. They would naturally follow if the
information acquisition problem of ﬁrms was to be fully modelled. The convexity
16See Park [1995], Kim [1997] and Demougin and Fluet [1998].
17The derivative requirements on the probability distribution of the binary variable impose
conditions on the underlying information structure. Demougin and Fluet [1998] have shown that
if the underlying information system satisﬁes the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC)
and the Convexity of the Density Function Condition (CDFC), then the required conditions are
indeed satisﬁed.
13requirements guarantee that the ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient.
The timing of the game between ﬁrms and households (within a period) is as
follows. Firms oﬀer a bonus contract {A,B} where A denotes the ﬁxed payment
and B the bonus part of the contract. In addition, ﬁrms announce a precision
level θ by which they intend to measure the signals. As we assume that θ is not
contractible, the double moral hazard problem requires the ﬁrm to make a credible
announcement. Households either decide to have their members work for ﬁrms or
to remain self-employed. "Employee-households" select their level of eﬀort, given
the announced precision. The ﬁrms select the precision, which, in equilibrium, is
the same they have announced. Finally, signals are observed and payments are
made.
3.4. The bonus contract
For the subgame where ﬁrms select precision and households make a choice of
eﬀort, we use the Nash equilibrium concept. Starting with the problem of the
household, suppose it has chosen to send its members to work for ﬁrms. That
household faces a bonus contract {A,B} and expects the ﬁrm to implement a
precision level θ. The household chooses eﬀort to maximize utility derived from
the employment contract. Analytically, it solves
max
 
A + Bp( ,θ) − c( ) . (3.4)
From the foregoing, the ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient. Rewriting that condition






Given that each worker works for a ﬁr ma c c o r d i n gt ot h eb o n u ss c h e m e{A,B},
and given that the ﬁrm expects each worker to produce the eﬀort  ,t h eﬁrm will
choose precision, θ, to minimize its expected costs — i.e. the sum of precision costs
plus expected bonus and ﬁxed payments to workers. Hence, a ﬁrm will solve
min
θ
A + Bp( ,θ)+φ(θ) . (3.6)
Again, the ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient, yielding:
Bpθ( ,θ)+φ
0(θ)=0 . (3.7)
Given a contract {A,B}, the solution to the Nash game is a pair ( ,θ) that solves
(3.5) and (3.7). 18
3.5. The overall problem of the ﬁrm
In this subsection, we embed the contractual game in the larger context of the
ﬁrm’s overall decision problem. At this stage, in addition to determining the bonus
contract — thereby inducing the desired eﬀort — the ﬁrm must also select precision,
capital and employment. The ﬁrm takes as given the rental rate of capital. In
addition the ﬁrm faces a reservation utility for households. Altogether, the ﬁrm’s
problem can be written as:
18Note that the solution may not be unique. This, however, is not a problem since by an-
nouncing the contract the ﬁrm can select the best equilibrium for itself.
15max
 ,θ,A,B,K,L
F(K, L) − [A + Bp( ,θ)+φ(θ)]L − rK +( 1− δ)K (3.8)
Bp ( ,θ) − c
0( )=0 (3.9a)
A + Bp( ,θ) − c( ) ≥ y (3.9b)
Bpθ( ,θ)+φ
0(θ)=0 (3.9c)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and y denotes the reservation utility of worker
households. The constraints (3.9a) and (3.9b) are the household’s incentive and
participation conditions and (3.9c) is the credibility requirement for the ﬁrm’s
announcement of precision.
In the remaining, it is advantageous to use the homogeneity of the produc-
tion function to rewrite the objective function of the ﬁr mi np e rw o r k e rt e r m s .
Speciﬁcally denote
Lf(k, ) ≡ F(kL, L) ,
where k measures the capital labor ratio. Substituting this deﬁnition in the ﬁrm’s
problem and abstracting from the employment decision, we can rewrite problem
(3.8). Since the ﬁrm takes y as given, it is easily seen that (3.9b) will be just
binding. Therefore A can be eliminated from the ﬁrm’s problem. Similarly, B
can be eliminated by using the constraints (3.9a) and (3.9c). Altogether the
optimization problem of the ﬁrm can be reduced to a Lagrange problem:
max
 ,θ,k











163.6. The household’s problem revisited
When deriving the optimal bonus contract above, C = {A,B,θ},w eh a v ea s s u m e d
that households care about the expected income net of eﬀort costs of each of their
members (see (3.4)). Here we show that under the derived bonus contract this
assumption is consistent with the dynamic optimization problem of households.
In general, every household decides each period on the employment status of
its members, possibly on eﬀort, and on saving and consumption. Saved income
turns into capital next period and will be rented out in the capital market. The







t[xt − c( t)] (3.11a)




At + Btp( t,θ t) if employed
y(h) if self-employed
(3.11b)
xt ≥ x (3.11c)
where the household is assumed to have perfect foresight over future rental rates
and employment contracts and k0 is given. We denote the solution to the problem
by the sequence {kt+1(h),  t(h),x t(h)}∞
t=0.
From the optimization problem it should be evident that the following holds.
Lemma 3.1. Given a contract Ct = {At,B t,θ t} in period t,t h ee ﬀort level chosen
by a household of employees is
 t =a r gm a x
  At + Btp( ,θt) − c( ) .( 3 . 11l)
17Furthermore, the fraction of households that choose the "employee" status is given
every period by z,w h e r ez solves:
y(z)=m a x
 
At + Btp( ,θt) − c( ). (3.11m)
Thus, due to the linearity of the utility function, despite the dynamic structure
households maximize every period their income net of eﬀort costs.
4. A speciﬁcation
4.1. Monitoring
The monitoring part is the least standard in our paper. Therefore, the speciﬁcation
used in the sequel needs special motivation. Consider an environment where an
agent in the course of carrying out his work emits signals that are related to his
eﬀort. In particular, these signals take the value 0 or 1 w h e r e0i st h e“ f a v o r a b l e ”
signal. Let Y denote the number of unfavorable signals. We assume that Y is
generated by a Poisson process. The density parameter of that process (i.e. the
expected value of unfavorable signals) is negatively related to the agent’s eﬀort.
In particular, we specify that relationship to be  −ν,w h e r eν is the elasticity of the
density parameter with respect to eﬀort. We assume that in addition to the process
generated by the agent’s eﬀort, there is another independent Poisson process with
ad e n s i t yp a r a m e t e rm, that interferes with the eﬀort-related process. The sum
of the two processes is a Poisson process, with a density parameter m +  −ν.
Let
18a( ,m)=e x p ( −m −  
−ν) (4.1)
denote the probability that no adverse signal is observed when all signals are
detected.
Suppose that a monitoring device samples a proportion θ of the signals. The
probability that no adverse signal is observed within the sample is, therefore,
a( ,m)θ.
We already know from the foregoing that in the type of environment just
described the optimal labor contract, when only signals are observed, is of the
bonus type. Moreover, Demougin and Fluet [2001] have shown that for the eﬃcient
contract, the bonus should be paid only when no unfavorable signal is detected.




4.2. Production and costs
We assume that the cost functions are represented by
φ(θ)=φ · θ
α,α > 1 (4.3a)
c( )=c ·  
β,β > 1 (4.3b)
Finally, the production technologies are speciﬁed to be a standard Cobb-




1−γ 0 <γ<1 (4.4a)
y(z)=y0z
µ 0 <µ (4.4b)
Where T and y0 are positive constants.
5. Equilibrium




kt+1(h)dh and Xt =
R
xt(h)dh denote aggregate capital and consump-
tion, such that
(i) ﬁrms solve problem (10),
(ii) households solve (11),
(iii) ﬁrms’ proﬁt are zero,
(iv) kt = Kt/zt,
(v) yt = y(zt).
Using the above speciﬁcation, a steady state of the economy is given by the
following set of conditions:
20T(1 − γ)k
γ 
−γ − βc 


































A + B exp
£




β = y (5.6b)
Finally, we also have three market clearing conditions:
Tk
γ 
1−γ − A − B exp
£










Equation (5.7a) is the zero proﬁt condition. Condition (5.7b) requires that in the
steady state the market clearing interest rate be given by the household discount
factor. Finally, (5.7c) determines the opportunity cost of the marginal household
in the ﬁrm sector.
The overall system is block recursive and can be easily simpliﬁed. First, we
eliminate r and y from (5.7b) and (5.7c). Second, equation (5.5c) implies that






















− (1 − δ)) = 0. (5.8b)
From these equations, we obtain   and k,a n dθ follows from (5.5d). Finally, A,B
obtain from (5.6a)-(5.6b).
6. Comparing steady-states
In this section, we perform some steady state comparisons with respect to changes
in the equilibrium interest rate and the eﬀectiveness of the monitoring technol-
ogy. The ﬁrst exercise allows us to examine the relationship between changes
in the interest rate and some key features of the economy, in particular eﬀort
and productivity.19 The second exercise focusses on variations in the monitoring
environment and will be used to show that these changes can account for large
diﬀerences in the induced productivity.
6.1. Changes in the interest rate
In order to simplify notation, we rewrite the ﬁrms’ problem. We solve for the
precision variable from (5.5d), thus eliminating both θ and the constraint. The
ﬁrms’ problem then becomes:
19The interest rate is, of course, endogenous. Changes in the interest rate may be due to
changes in the subjective discount factor or the depreciation rate. In addition, one may introduce













− y +( 1− δ − r)k . (6.9)
Writing the ﬁrst-order conditions in   and k, we obtain from implicit diﬀerentia-
tion:
 r = −
π k
detH
6 0 and kr =
π  
detH
6 0 ,( 6 . 10)
where H is the relevant Hessian. The signs follow from the local concavity at the
maximum — which yields detH>0 and π   < 0 — and because capital and eﬀort
are complements, i.e. π k > 0. We summarize our conclusion in the following
result:
Result 1: Lower steady-state interest rates are associated with higher eﬀort.
The result is very intuitive. Lower interest rates are associated with higher
capital labor ratios and the higher eﬀort follows from the complementarity as-
sumption. Thus, other things being equal, we conclude that a highly capitalized
economy (namely, an economy with a high capital-labor ratio) should also be
c h a r a c t e r i z e db yh i g he ﬀort of employees. The latter implies high total factor
productivity.
Next, we turn to the labor contract required to induce the desired eﬀort,  .
From (5.5d), we observe that   and θ move in the same direction, thus, θr < 0.
However, from the point of view of the household, what really matters is the
impact of these changes on its expected bonus which we refer to as power and
denote with P. From (5.6a), after some manipulation, it is easy to show that
Pr < 0. We summarize these observations as:
Result 2: Lower steady-state interest rates are associated with higher precision
and higher contract power.
23Finally, in order to obtain the eﬀect of a change in the interest rate on the
fraction of workers employed, notice that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are a decreasing function
of r.T h u s , t o k e e p p r o ﬁts at zero, y must also be decreasing in r.S i n c e y is
increasing in z, we obtain:
Result 3: Lower steady-state interest rates are associated with a larger fraction
of the labor force working for the "corporate sector".
Altogether, diﬀerences in the interest rate induce co-movements in the capital-
labor ratio, in employment and in eﬀort. Consequently, total factor productivity
may be changing in the "corporate sector" independently of any technical change
in that sector.
6.2. Changes in the monitoring environment
We represent changes in the monitoring environment as variations in m.T h e s e
variations aﬀect the ability of the monitoring device to detect the underlying
signals emitted by the worker. Interferences with this ability to accurately mea-
sure the workers’ signals imply increases in m, and may emerge if, for example,
information that is extraneous to that worker’s tasks is taken into account.20
From (6.9) we see that the eﬀective marginal costs of eﬀort are everywhere
increasing in m. Thus we can derive along the exact same line as in the foregoing
subsection the eﬀect of changes in m. The consequences for the steady states are
summarized in the following result.
Result 4: More informative measures of steady state eﬀort are associated with
higher capital-labor ratios, more eﬀort, higher monitoring precision and power,
20One may think of issues like political aﬃliation, sex, ethnicity. Legal requirements may also
interfere with precision.
24and a higher fraction of the labor force working for the “corporate sector”.
7. The Model’s Performance
7.1. The Baseline
The baseline economy’s parameters are chosen in an attempt to emulate some
common characteristic of a “typical” economy (on a yearly basis). In particular,
we aim at achieving a labor share of roughly 70% of output, and a share of
“employees” of roughly 70% of the labor force.21 We also aim at a “reasonable”
saving rate of roughly 20% of output. Some of the parameters are set at their by
now standard values: the depreciation rate, δ,i ss e ta t0.08, the discount factor,
η,i s0.95.
The remaining parameters were chosen by trial and error, as follows. For the
monitoring cost, we have φ =2 ,a n dα =1 .45.F o r t h e e ﬀort disutility, we set:
c =0 .1 and β =1 .45.T h ee ﬀort detection probability is assumed to be generated
by   with ν =1and m =0 . The production function in the “corporate sector”
is characterized by T =0 .7 and a standard value of 0.3 for γ. The production
function for the self-employed is speciﬁed with y0 =2and µ =2 .22
21The corresponding averages in the Bernanke and Gürkaynak sample are 70% for the share
of corporate employees and 67.5% for the share of labor in income.
22While this value of µ may seem to be “large” in terms of its implication for the average
productivity of self-employed workers, it is generating reasonable implications for the evolution
of their productivity in comparison with the rest of the economy.
25Table 1: The Baseline Steady-State
Variable
Per-capita Total Output (y) 2.64
Saving Rate 0.20













1 Share of employee and self-employed compensation in total output
2 Share of monitoring costs in total output23
3 Share of ”corporate sector" in total output
4 Total factor productivity in ”corporate sector"
5 O u t p u tp e rw o r k e ri n” s e l f - e m p l o y e d ”s e c t o r .
23Notice that the monitoring costs are not counted as part of the economy’s total output.
267.2. Monitoring Technology
To study the impact of the monitoring technology, we run two numerical exper-
iments. The ﬁrst involves changing the impact of a given level of eﬀort on the
likelihood of receiving a favorable/unfavorable signal through the value of ν.T h e
second experiment involves the addition of the external noise, m, to the detection
technology. We examine in particular the resulting eﬀect on output, productivity,
s h a r eo fe m p l o y e e si nt h el a b o rf o r c ea n dt h el a b o rs h a r ei ni n c o m e . W ec o m -
pare the results of the experiments to the performance of these variables in the
data, and draw some tentative conclusions on the potential source of cross-country
diﬀerences.
First, we allow ν to range between 0.8 and 2.4 (at steps of 0.1).24 We use the
output and productivity results of the "best" economy (v =2 .4) as the standard
of comparison, and report in the following ﬁgures the performance of the other
economies along these measures in relative terms.
Figure 5 resembles the actual data (see Figure 1). Both relative measures of
productivity increase as the relative output (per-worker) increases. Moreover, the
relationship is non-linear, and quantitatively similar to the analogous segment of
Figure 1. However, these changes in ν alone cannot account for the entire range
of diﬀerences found in the data.25
24This is the range for which the model yields interior solutions.
25While this example cannot match the 7.7 factor Hall and Jones [1999] ﬁnd for the diﬀerence
between the U.S. productivity and that of Niger, our model gets the slope of Figure I in their
paper (on page 90) about right. There, a factor of 4 i no u t p u tp e rw o r k e ri sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha
factor of about 2 in total factor productivity.
27Figure 5:
Output and TFP
























Figure 6 displays a strong association between the productivity index and the
fraction of corporate employees in the labor force. This is clearly in line with the
data, as shown in Figure 2. However, from the quantitative point of view, the
model generates “too much” employment in the “corporate sector”, and in fact,
a tt h eh i g h e s tv a l u eo fν, the entire labor force becomes “employed”.
28Figure 6:
Productivity and Employment
















































29This ﬁgure shows that the labor share has a slight inclination to decline as
productivity increases, but the relationship is overall weak, as is the case in Figure
3.
For the purpose of comparison, we let also m vary from 2 (the worst case) to











































































While Figures 8 and 9 resemble Figures 1 and 2, Figure 10 describes a dramatic
31decline in the share of labor in output as productivity increases. This is a clear
contradiction to the facts, as shown in Figure 3.
The example shows that the model can potentially identify the source of dif-
ferences among countries. In particular, the model implies that these diﬀerences
cannot be ascribed to the noisiness of the signal that reaches the detection appa-
ratus. Rather, the model indicates that the diﬀerences are due to the sensitivity
with which the apparatus detects the signal and its impact on the ability of labor
contracts to induce eﬀort.26
7.3. Dynamics
We turn to the growth path of the base-line economy. The economy is started
with a third of its steady-state capital. We set x (the subsistence level) to 1.1.27
The economy reaches the steady-state after 55 periods. We describe ﬁrst the
economy’s growth performance, through Figure 11.
26While disturbances to the detection apparatus that are represented by m may be associated
with the interference of the political system in the evaluation of workers, the parameter ν may
reﬂect societal attitudes towards equity and competition.
27This parameter has no implications for the steady-state. The choice is motivated by the








































































Figure 11 depicts the growth rates of output as well as of the total factor
productivity in the “corporate sector" and of the output per worker in the “self-
employed” sector. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the growth rates are all ac-
celerating towards the steady-state. The total factor productivity growth rate
accounts for a bit below one half of the output growth rate. The productivity
growth is due to the fact that as the economy is accumulating capital, more work-
ers are needed for the “corporate sector”. These workers have to be enticed away
from self-employment. As the productivity of the marginal self-employed worker
increases, a better contract has to be oﬀered to the corporate workers. This, in
turn, entails more monitoring and higher productivity.
Finally, in Figure 12 we show the evolution of the fraction of workers employed
in the “corporate sector” and the monitoring costs relative to output. The ﬁgure
clearly shows that the need to entice more workers into the “corporate sector” is
33indeed associated with higher monitoring costs. This result corresponds closely
with Radner’s (1992) ﬁndings summarized above. Both in reality and in the model,












































































































This paper generates total factor productivity gains that are unrelated to any tech-
nological progress. In fact, production technologies are kept constant throughout
the analysis. However, out of steady-state the economy is accumulating capital.
The workers who use this capital need to be enticed away by the “corporate sector”
from an alternative occupation. The productivity of the marginal worker in that
alternative occupation is assumed to increase as more workers are employed. This
34forces wages in the "corporate sector" to increase. To justify the higher wages,
workers need to exert more eﬀort. In order to induce higher eﬀort, employers must
increase their investment in monitoring, and the result is higher productivity.
Thus, the model we have shows how the increased pressure from an alternative
sector (in our case - the “self employed” sector) induces increased productivity
in the “corporate sector”. Clearly, one may think of other sources of pressure
that may trigger the same eﬀect. Competition from other countries generated by
trade-liberalization can clearly be one such factor (see e.g. Schmitz [2001]).
Our use of the double moral hazard as a device to create transaction costs
is certainly not the only way to create an “organizational” link between growth
and TFP. For example, in a standard moral hazard problem with risk-averse
workers, ﬁrms would in general be forced to pay a risk premium, thereby creating
ab e n e ﬁt to monitoring. Again, as the economy moves along a growth path,
marginal beneﬁts are likely to be aﬀected, and optimal contracts would change.
Whether this would lead to a co-movement between growth and productivity is an
open question. A similar argument could be made in a model with heterogeneous
workers in the presence of adverse selection, or by introducing multi-tasking. More
generally, in any environment with transaction costs, the optimal organizational
form is likely to be aﬀe c t e db yg r o w t h ,a n di nt u r n ,a ﬀect productivity. Thus,
there seems to be a wide scope of interaction between an economy’s organization,
its growth and its productivity, that needs to be further explored.
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